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Abstract—Inspired by our earlier work on Automatic Repeat
reQuest (ARQ) secrecy, we propose a simple, yet efficient,
security overlay protocol to existing 802.11 networks. Our work
targets networks secured by the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
protocol because of its widespread use and vulnerability to a
multitude of security threats. By exploiting the existing ARQ
protocol in the 802.11 standard, our proposed opportunistic
secrecy scheme is shown to defend against all known passive
WEP attacks. Moreover, our implementation on the madwifi-ng
driver is used to establish the achievability of a vanishing secrecy
outage probability in several realistic scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wi-Fi networks are gaining popularity, in a wide variety of
applications, at an exponential rate. Despite its vulnerability
to several known security attacks and the availability of more
robust security protocols, i.e., WPA and WPA2, the Wired
Equivalence Privacy (WEP) protocol is still widely used for
securing Wi-Fi networks. As of October 2008, RSA, The
Security Division of EMC, reported that 48%, 38% and 24%
of NYC, London and Paris Wi-Fi networks still employ the
WEP protocol, respectively [18]. The reason is, arguably, the
significant advantage that the WEP protocol enjoys, in terms of
user friendliness, over competing approaches. This observation
motivates our work. More specifically, we propose a novel
variant of the WEP protocol that is capable of overcoming all
passive WEP attacks, in a strong probabilistic sense which will
be made rigorous in the sequel, while preserving the same user
interface as the traditional WEP protocol. The proposed ARQ-
WEP protocol is inspired by information theoretic principles
and exploits the existing ARQ feedback adopted in the 802.11
standard.
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence in information
theoretic security research. This line of work has mostly tar-
geted wireless networking applications and has been largely in-
spired by Wyner’s pioneering work on the wiretap channel [1],
[2]. In this model, two users wish to securely communicate
over a noisy channel in the presence of an eavesdropper;
also impaired by a noisy channel. Quite remarkably, a non-
zero secrecy capacity was shown to be achievable in [1],
without any limiting assumptions on the eavesdropper
computational power or the availability of a private key, if
the wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the legitimate
one. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner later extended this result to the
non-degraded channel scenario [3]. More recently, in [4],
[5], the effect of slow fading on the secrecy capacity was
studied, where it was shown that the secrecy capacity could be
enhanced by distributing the secure message across different
fading realizations. Of particular relevance to this paper is
the approach proposed in [6] for exchanging secure messages
using Hybrid ARQ protocols. This technique, however, suffers
from a secrecy outage phenomenon resulting from the alloca-
tion of each secure message to only one ARQ epoch. Our
work [7] develops a unified framework for sharing keys using
ARQ which overcomes the secrecy outage phenomenon and
lends itself to low complexity implementations. In fact, under
the assumption of an error-free and public ARQ feedback,
our results established the achievability of non-zero key rates,
with a vanishing probability of secrecy outage, even when the
eavesdropper is enjoying a higher average signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) than the legitimate receiver [7]. The seemingly counter-
intuitive result is another manifestation of the opportunistic
secrecy principle formulated in [4].
Building on this information theoretic foundation, this paper
proposes a practical security protocol for Wi-Fi networks.
Instead of aiming at a complete overhaul of the security mech-
anism adopted in the 802.11 standard, our overlay protocol
only requires minor modifications in the current implementa-
tion of the popular WEP protocol. The resulting ARQ-WEP
protocol, however, offers significant advantages over the com-
peting approaches. On one hand, it inherits the simplicity of
implementation and user friendliness from the WEP protocol
(as opposed to the WPA and WPA2 protocols). The ARQ-
WEP protocol, on the other hand, achieves significant security
gains relative to the traditional implementation of the WEP
protocol. More specifically, our analytical and experimental
results reveal the ability of the ARQ-WEP protocol to defend
against all passive WEP attacks at the expense of a slight
degradation in throughput over the original WEP protocol.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the main ingredients of the WEP protocol and
identifies its vulnerabilities. In Section III, the basic idea
behind ARQ security is introduced. The ARQ-WEP protocol,
is developed in Section IV. Section V demonstrates the sig-
nificant security advantage offered by the ARQ-WEP protocol
via our experimental results. Finally, we offer some concluding
remarks in Section VI.
II. THE WEP PROTOCOL
We now review the basic setup of the WEP security pro-
tocol. Our overarching goal is to unveil the main weakness
of the protocol, and hence, motivate our information theoretic
solution based on ARQ secrecy. Here, a sender node (Alice)
sends a number of encrypted data frames, nd, to a receiver
node (Bob), in a Wi-Fi network secured by WEP. Both nodes
follow the ARQ mechanism adopted in the IEEE 802.11
standard.
Alice and Bob are assumed to share a single 104-bit
private key, Ks, which is used to encrypt/decrypt all nd
data frames sent by Alice. For the ith data frame, containing
a message M(i), a CRC32 checksum (used as an Integrity
Check Value), i.e., ICV (M(i)), is computed and appended to
the message forming the plaintext, P (i). The RC4 algorithm is
then seeded with the concatenation of a pseudo-random 24-bit
Initialization Vector (IV), denoted by V (i), and the private key
to generate the keystream, RC4 (V (i),Ks). The ciphertext,
C(i), is obtained by XORing the plaintext with the generated
keystream. Finally, Alice sends C(i) along with the IV. More
formally,
C(i) = P (i)
⊕
RC4 (V (i),Ks) , (1)
A→ B : V (i), C(i). (2)
After recovering the IV, which was sent as plaintext
in the MAC header, Bob generates the RC4 keystream,
RC4 (V (i),Ks), and XORes it with the received ciphertext
to obtain the plaintext, P´ (i). The final step is to compute
a checksum, ICV ,´ from the received message, M (´i), and
compare it with the received ICV (´i). If they match, successful
decryption is declared and the frame is passed to higher layers;
otherwise an error is declared and the frame is dropped.
A brief overview of the history of WEP attacks is now in
order. WEP design failures were first reported by Borisov,
Goldberg, and Wagner in 2001 [11]. They showed that the
ICV cannot be used against malicious attacks. Additionally,
they observed that old IVs could be reused, allowing for a
straightforward path for packet injection. During the same
year, Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir presented the first key
recovery attack against WEP (known as the FMS attack) by
exploiting the weaknesses of the Key Scheduling Algorithm
used in RC4 [12]. They further identified certain classes of
weak IVs which, if used, can enable the recovery of the private
key from a relatively small number of observations. In 2004,
the KoreK chopchop attack demonstrated the feasibility of
breaking the WEP using the CRC32 checksum [13]. During
the same year, KoreK introduced an enhanced set of attacks
that break WEP without relying on weak IVs [14]. Later in
2005, Klein proposed a rather efficient approach for iteratively
computing all of the secret key bytes, without the need of weak
IVs as well [15]. The IEEE 802.11 fragmentation support was
used in the Bittau attack, which appeared in 2006 [16]. In
2007, Pyshkin, Tews, and Weinmann (PTW) developed an
enhanced version of the Klein attack by using key ranking
techniques [17]. The PTW attack is considered to be the most
efficient attack against WEP at the moment.
Careful inspection of passive WEP attacks reveals their
critical dependence on collecting a large number of ci-
phertext/plaintext pairs with unique IVs which are sent
Fig. 1. System Model
as plaintext. For example, following aircrack-ng recommen-
dation [19], an attacker would typically need 1.5 million
frames with unique IVs, before launching a combined FMS
and KoreK [14] passive WEP attacks1. Plaintext bytes could
be guessed through the knowledge of the format of upper
layer packets, e.g., ARP or IPv4 packets. Advanced statistical
techniques can be used to recover the only unknown variable,
i.e., the private key Ks, without much difficulty. In a nutshell,
sending the IVs in the clear, along with using the same private
Ks in all frames, is the main vulnerability of the WEP
protocol. Our proposed solution will transform the IVs into
secret keys by exploiting the available ARQ mechanism in the
802.11 standard. This way, we overcome the main weakness
of the WEP protocol while preserving the simplicity and user
friendliness associated with using only one private key. Before
proceeding to describing the detailed implementation of the
proposed ARQ-WEP protocol, the next section develops the
ARQ secrecy framework.
III. KEYS THROUGH ARQ
Our main idea will be demonstrated in a simplified model
with one transmitter (Alice), one legitimate receiver (Bob),
and one passive eavesdropper (Eve). The underlying multi-
path fading channels are modeled as binary time-varying
block erasure channels. We assume a time-slotted system
where time slots correspond to coherence intervals, such that
each channel remains fixed over one time slot and changes
randomly across time slots. Each ARQ epoch is transmitted in
one time slot and if the frame is received, an ACK message is
sent over the feedback link. A NACK message corresponds to
no transmission (as stipulated by the 802.11 standard). Hence,
an erasure event over the Bob-Alice channel will transform
an ACK into a NACK. We let γXY (i) ∈ [0, 1] denote the
erasure probability at time slot i for the channel connecting
transmitter X to receiver Y . The erasure events are assumed
to be temporally and spatially independent while the erasure
probabilities are assumed to be random variables which are
correlated across space while being independent and identi-
cally distributed over time. The transmitter is assumed to know
a-priori the joint distribution of the erasure probabilities but
not their instantaneous values. The assumptions correspond to
a Gaussian channel with independent additive noise, spatially
correlated multi-path fading, no prior transmitter channel state
1An implementation for this set of attacks is available online in aircrack-ng
toolset [19]
information (CSI), and perfect error detection. Figure 1 sum-
marizes our modeling assumptions and the following result
characterizes the maximum achievable secure key rate, under
the assumption of noiseless feedback, i.e., γBA(i) = 0 ∀i,
Theorem 1: The secret key capacity for for the block era-
sure ARQ channel with noiseless feedback is
Ck = E [(1− γAB) γAE ] (3)
Proof: The proof can be obtained as a special case of
the main result in [7]. For the sake of completeness, however,
the following is a sketch of the achievability argument. Alice
wishes to share a secret key W ∈ W = {1, 2, · · · ,M} with
Bob. Towards this end, Alice and Bob use an (M,m) code
consisting of : 1) a stochastic encoder fm(.) at Alice that maps
the key w to a codeword xm ∈ 2m, 2) a decoding function φ:
2m → W which is used by Bob to recover the key. Each
codeword is partitioned into k blocks each of n1 symbols
corresponding to one ARQ epoch (m = k n1).
Alice starts by a random choice of the first block of n1
symbols and sends it to Bob. If Bob successfully decodes
this block, an ACK bit is sent to Alice. Otherwise, the frame
is discarded by Bob and nothing is sent back. Upon the
reception of an ACK bit, Alice stores the acknowledged frame,
makes a random choice of the second block and sends it to
Bob. If no ACK is received, Alice replaces the first block
with another randomly chosen one and sends it to Bob. The
process continues until Alice and Bob agree on k blocks, each
of n1 symbols, corresponding to the private key. Using this
approach, Eve does not benefit from its observation of the
frames erased at Bob.
One can easily see that this protocol has transformed our
ARQ channel into an erasure wiretap channel without feed-
back. In this equivalent model, the main channel is noiseless
and the erasure probability at Eve is given by
ǫ(i) = γAE(i) (1− γAB(i)) . (4)
Under the assumption of an asymptotically large k, we apply
the classical degraded wiretap channel results [1] to obtain (3).
A few remarks are now in order
1) In the aforementioned security protocol, erasure events
in the feedback channel will lead to mis-synchronization
between Alice and Bob. This problem can be easily
overcome at the expense of a larger overhead in the
feedforward and feedback channel. Alice would include
all the history of received ACK/NACK in each frame.
Once an ACK is received, Alice will be assured that Bob
has correctly received the past history. Alice will then
flush the past history and will only include the recently
received ACK/NACK messages in future transmissions.
If we stop here, then the achievable key rate becomes
Rk = E [(1− γAB) (1− γBA) γAE ] . (5)
The loss in rate, due to the dropped ACK frames, can
be avoided if the feedback channel can accommodate
more bits. In this case, Bob will resend all the previ-
ously dropped ACK bits along with the current one.
Then, Alice will modify its past history accordingly
and the same key will be generated by both nodes
once synchronization is achieved. Clearly, this approach
achieves the key rate reported in (3) when both k and
n1 are asymptotically large, rendering the overhead loss
negligible.
2) One may be tempted to assume that the noisy feedback
from Bob to Eve will allow for increasing the secret
key capacity. Unfortunately, Eve can easily overcome
the loss of ACK bits via an exhaustive trial and error
approach. More rigorously, since the ratio of feedback
bits over feedforward bits is vanishingly small, the
loss of ACK bits will not lead to an increase in the
equivocation at Eve.
3) By invoking the classical wiretap channel results in our
achievability argument, we implicitly assumed the use of
a binning codebook [1]. Recent works have established
the existence of Low Density Parity Check (LDPC)
codes that achieve the secrecy capacity of the erasure
wiretap channel under consideration in [8]–[10]. This
approach, however, suffers from two drawbacks: 1) the
complexity of LDPC coding/decoding can be prohibitive
for many practical applications and 2) the delay, as
measured by the number of successfully received ARQ
epochs k, is asymptotically large. The following scheme
avoids these limitations. The frames are chosen accord-
ing to a i.i.d. uniform distribution over the binary alpha-
bet {0, 1} and the key is distilled as the modulo-2 sum of
the k successfully received frames at Bob. Clearly, this
scheme enjoys a very low encoding/decoding complexity
and, via the appropriate choice of k, one can limit the
decoding delay. The choice of k will, also, determine
the operating point on the secrecy-throughput tradeoff
curve. More specifically, Eve will be completely blind
about the key if at least one of the k frames is erased.
Hence, the probability of secrecy outage is given by
Pout =
k∏
i=1
[1− γAE(i)] , (6)
where γAE(1), .., γAE(k) are i.i.d random variables
drawn according to the distribution of Eve’s channel. On
the other hand, the average number of trials required to
successfully transmit the k ARQ frames to Bob is
E[n] = kE
[
1
1− γAB
]
, (7)
resulting in the following key rate
Rk =
1
E[n]
=
1
k E
[
1
1−γAB
] . (8)
Hence, choosing a larger k will result in a smaller
probability of secrecy outage at the expense of a lower
key rate and a larger delay. If we account for erasure
events in the feedback channel, with only ACK/NACK
feedback, the achievable key rate becomes
Rk =
1
E[n]
=
1
kE
[
1
(1−γAB) (1−γBA)
] . (9)
In the following section, the aforementioned modulo-2 key
sharing scheme will be used to secure the WEP protocol.
IV. THE ARQ-WEP PROTOCOL
Our proposed protocol conceals the Initialization Vectors
(IVs) from Eve by introducing slight modifications to the
currently implemented WEP protocol in 802.11 networks. Our
goal is to prevent Eve from collecting the required number of
IVs to launch her attack. This goal is achieved by seeding
the RC4 algorithm with an IV that is distributed over all
previously sent frames in a fashion that utilizes both the ARQ
protocol and the independence between the channels seen by
Eve and Bob. To formally describe the algorithm, we need the
following notations. Let Q(i) = 1 if Alice receives an ACK
for in ith frame (Q(i) = 0 otherwise) and S(i) = 1 if Bob
successfully decrypts the ith frame (S(i) = 0 otherwise).
For data encryption, we apply the following modifications.
We let the ith data frame carry a new randomly-generated IV
in its MAC header, denoted by Vh(i). However, for each data
frame, the RC4 algorithm is seeded with the modulo-2 sum
of all header IVs which were sent by Alice and successfully
received by Bob. This sum is referred to as Ve(i). As opposed
to the original WEP protocol, i.e., (1) and (2), in the ith
transmitted frame we have:
Ve(i) =
{
Ve(i − 1)
⊕
Vh(i− 1), if Q(i− 1) = 1 ;
Ve(i − 1), otherwise.
(10)
C(i) = P (i)
⊕
RC4 (Ve(i),Ks) , (11)
A→ B : Vh(i), C(i), (12)
where Ve(0) = 0. Bob attempts to decrypt the ith received
frame with Ks and the modulo-2 sum of all IVs perviously
received, referred to as Vd(i). If decryption fails, Bob excludes
the last IV from the sum, i.e.,
Vd(i) =
{
Vd(i − 1)
⊕
Vh(i− 1), if S(i− 1) = 1 ;
Vd(i − 1), otherwise.
(13)
Again, Vd(0) = 0. Furthermore, the history of all received
ACKs by Alice is embedded in each encrypted frame. This
way, we avoid any mis-synchronization that could happen due
to the loss of an ACK frame; without any additional feedback
bits.
Now, in order to launch an attack, Eve attempts to collect
as many of the data frames sent by Alice as possible. In
our scheme, however, the usefulness of the collected traffic
depends on Eve’s ability to correctly compute Ve for each
received frame. Such ability is hampered as Eve becomes
completely blind upon missing a single ACKed frame. This
observation motivates the use of a number of initialization
frames at the beginning of each session (before any data
exchange), to reduce the secrecy outage probability by adding
more IVs to the encryption sum. The initialization frames
contain only IVs, as plaintext, so as to reveal no information
about the secret key, Ks. The experimental results, reported in
the following section, will investigate the throughput-secrecy
tradeoff governed by the ratio of the total size of initialization
frames to the session size, in different practical settings. In
summary, the IV used for encryption/decryption is the
secret key shared via the underlying ARQ protocol.
Finally, we report some of the implementation details. Our
ARQ-WEP prototype was incorporated in the madwifi-ng
driver [20] by modifying the wlan wep and ath pci modules,
in software encryption mode. The detection of acknowl-
edgments and timeout events was established by using the
Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) reports to the driver. In
an infra-structure network architecture, the Access Point (AP)
and each client store all the necessary information for data
exchange. The eavesdropper has to maintain similar informa-
tion for each client/AP session of interest. Initialization frames
are implemented as (un-encrypted) association management
frames with extended subtypes. To optimize performance,
these frames are exchanged in bursts with the use of custom
NACKs. The average initialization frame length is 42 bytes,
which is negligible, as compared to a typical data frame size.
The total number of initialization frames varies depending on
the required secrecy level and acceptable overhead.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We deployed the modified madwifi-ng driver on laptops
running the FC8 Linux distribution and D-Link wireless cards
(DWL-G650). We ran the experiments in an infra-structure
IEEE 802.11g network composed of an AP and a single client
(STA), with one passive eavesdropper, enabled in monitor
mode.
We first evaluate the expected number of useful frames that
Eve obtains per session, i.e., the data frames that Eve could
successfully compute their encryption IVs. For each session
between Alice and Bob, the expected number of these frames
can be upper bounded as
E[u] ≤
E[γ´AE ]
ki+1 − E[γ´AE ]
k+1
E[γAE ]
, (14)
where γ´AE = 1 − γAE , ki is the number of initialization
frames successfully received by Bob, and k is the total number
of frames successfully received by Bob. As shown in (14), a
slight increase of the overhead introduced by the initialization
frames, results in a significant decrease in the number of
frames Eve could use per session, and thus, a significant
increase in the listening time needed to launch an attack.
We validated our analytical estimate experimentally by
generating one-way traffic between the AP (Alice) and the
client node (Bob). We equipped Eve’s driver with the same
logic used in our protocol, i.e. the modified driver monitors all
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Fig. 2. The average number of useful frames obtained by Eve. E[γAB ] =
0.005, E[γBA] = 0.009 and E[γAE ] = 0.004
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Fig. 3. The average number of useful frames obtained by Eve per session.
E[γAB ] = 0.01, E[γBA] = 0.01 and E[γAE ] = 0.02
transmitted frames in the network, extracts their IVs, and sums
them based on the observed ACKs/timeouts. We launched two
experiments in two different environments. In the first, Eve
was observed to have better channel conditions, on the average,
than Bob. While in the second, the situation was reversed and
all channels suffered from relatively large erasure probabilities.
We ran each experiment at different numbers of initialization
frames, compared the IVs obtained by Eve and Bob, and
calculated the average number of useful frames at Eve, over
40 trials for each sample point. For both experiments, the data
session size is 100000 frames.
The results are reported in Figures 2 and 3. The disagree-
ment between the analytical estimates and the experimental
results appears to be due to the small number of samples used
in our experiments. However, to compare our secrecy gain
relative to the original WEP, one can use the reported results
in these figures to estimate the required time for Eve to gather
the required 1.5 million frames to launch an attack. Under the
standard WEP operation, we optimistically assume that Eve
needs 10 minutes to gather such traffic. On the other hand,
the estimated average attack time, with the proposed ARQ-
WEP and no initialization overhead, is 19.35 hours and 5.23
days, for the first and second setups, respectively. An overhead
of 0.001 extends the required average listening time to 1.24
years and 5.07 years, respectively. Clearly, the ARQ-WEP
is able to achieve very impressive secrecy gains with only
a marginal loss in throughput.
VI. CONCLUSION
To the best of our knowledge, this paper constitutes the
first attempt at securing practical wireless networks using
information theoretic principles. The proposed ARQ-WEP
protocol was able to avoid the main vulnerability of the WEP
protocol, namely, the transmission of the IV header as a
clear text, via only minor modifications of the existing WEP
encryption mechanism. The underlying idea is to benefit from
ARQ feedback and multi-path fading to create an advantage
for the legitimate receiver over potential eavesdroppers. Our
experimental results demonstrate the significant security ad-
vantage offered by the ARQ-WEP protocol over the traditional
implementation of the WEP protocol; e.g., a passive attack
that requires 10 minutes with the traditional WEP protocol
will need around a year of listening time with the ARQ-WEP
protocol under realistic implementation assumptions. The most
interesting aspect of our work is, perhaps, the development of
an information theoretic security protocol that enhances the
security of an existing security protocol, i.e., the WEP, at the
expense of a minimal additional complexity.
REFERENCES
[1] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell System Technical Journal,
volume 54, no. 8, pp. 1355-1387, 1975.
[2] L. H. Ozarow, and A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel II,” Bell System
Technical Journal, volume 63, no. 10, pp. 2135-2157, 1984.
[3] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,”
IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, vol. 24, pp. 339-348, May 1978.
[4] P. K. Gopala, L. Lai, and H. El Gamal, “On the secrecy capacity of
fading channels,” Submitted To The IEEE Trans. on Information Theory,
October 2007.
[5] X. Tang, R. Liu, P. Spasojevic, “On the achievable secrecy throughput of
block fading channels with no channel state information at transmitter,”
41st Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems CISS ’07,
pp. 917-922, March 2007.
[6] X. Tang, R. Liu, P. Spasojevic´, and H. V. Poor, “On the throughput of
secure hybrid-ARQ protocols for gaussian block-fading channels,” Proc.
of ISIT 2007, pp. 1355-1387, June 2007.
[7] M. Abdel Latif, A. Sultan, and H. El Gamal, “ARQ-Based Secret Key
Sharing,” The International Conference on Communications ICC’09,
June 2009.
[8] M. Bloch, A. Thangaraj, S. W. McLaughlin, and J. Merolla, “LDPC-based
secret key agreement over the gaussian wiretap channel,” Proc. of ISIT
2006, pp. 1179-1183, July 2006.
[9] A. Thangaraj, S. Dihidar, A. R. Calderbank, S. McLaughlin, and J-
M. Merolla, “Applications of LDPC codes to the wiretap channel,”
IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, volume 53, no. 8, pp. 2933-2945,
August 2007.
[10] A. Thangaraj, S. Dihidar, A. R. Calderbank, S. McLaughlin, and J-M.
Merolla, “On achieving capacity on the wire tap channel using LDPC
codes,” Proc. of ISIT 2005, pp. 1498-1502, September 2005.
[11] N. Borisov, I. Goldberg and D. Wagner, “Intercepting Mobile Commu-
nications: The Insecurity of 802.11,” ACM SIGMOBILE Annual Interna-
tional Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking 01, 2001.
[12] S. Fluhrer, I. Mantin, and A. Shamir, “Weaknesses in the key scheduling
algorithm of RC4,” Serge Vaudenay and Amr M. Youssef, editors’ Selected
Areas in Cryptography 2001, volume 2259 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pp. 1–24, Springer 2001.
[13] KoreK. chopchop (Experimental WEP attacks).
http://www.netstumbler.org/showthread.php?t=12489, 2004.
[14] KoreK. Next generation of WEP attacks?
http://www.netstumbler.org/f18/next-generation-wep-attacks-12277/ ,
2004.
[15] Andreas Klein. Attacks on the RC4 stream cipher. Submitted to Designs,
Codes and Cryptography, 2006.
[16] Andrea Bittau, Mark Handley, and Joshua Lackey. The final nail in
WEP’s coffin. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 386-
400. IEEE Computer Society, 2006.
[17] Erik Tews, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann, and Andrei Pyshkin. Breaking 104
bit wep in less than 60 seconds. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2007/120, http://eprint.iacr.org/, 2007.
[18] RSA 2008 WLAN surveys, http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=3268.
[19] Aircrack-ng toolset, http://aircrack-ng.org/doku.php.
[20] Madwifi-ng open-source driver, http://madwifi-project.org.
